https://www.cell.com/current-biology/fulltext/S0960-9822(23)00057-X?dgcid=raven_jbs_aip...

"The use of tool sets constitutes one of the most elaborate examples of animal technology, and reports of it in nature are limited to chimpanzees and Goffin’s cockatoos. Although tool set use in Goffin’s was only recently discovered, we know that chimpanzees flexibly transport tool sets, depending on their need. Flexible tool set transport can be considered full evidence for identification of a genuine tool set, as the selection of the second tool is not just a response to the outcomes of the use of the first tool but implies recognizing the need for both tools before using any of them (thus, categorizing both tools together as a tool set). In three controlled experiments, we tested captive Goffin’s in tasks inspired by the termite fishing of Goualougo Triangle’s chimpanzees. Thereby, we show that some Goffin’s can innovate the use and flexibly use and transport a new tool set for immediate future use; therefore, their sequential tool use is more than the sum of its parts.

***

"The most sophisticated types of animal tool innovations recorded to date are those that involve more than one tool to achieve a single goal (associative tool use).1 Within associative tool use, complexity arises for a variety of reasons, such as different tools having complementary functions, each tool requiring different movement patterns, a higher total number of spatial relationships to consider, or even a need for sophisticated action planning. A particularly remarkable form of associative tool use is the use of two or more different kinds of tools of different functions on the same goal, traditionally referred to as a tool set.1 Only two non-human species have been described to use tool sets in the wild beyond the anecdotal,5 chimpanzees and, as we only very recently learned, Goffin’s cockatoos.

***

"In the aforementioned tool set, Goffin’s were holding the fruit stone (goal) in their claw while crafting and using each tool, and only a single tool could be held at a time.6 This raises the historical doubts stated above regarding the planification of the use and categorization of both tools as a tool set: we do not know whether Goffin’s have the capacity to identify a tool set or if they build and use specific tools for individually perceived sub-steps of the problem. (my bold)

***

"Throughout this series of experiments, we revealed the ability of Goffin’s to innovate the use of a tool set, as well as to use and transport it in a flexible way, thus suggesting the ability to categorize both tools as a tool set.

***

"After solving their first session, most birds did not fail a single trial again throughout the whole experiment (only one bird did, Dolittle).
Although with differences between individuals, all solvers started showing switching behaviors between the two tools, grabbing and releasing and alternating them multiple times before the first insertion.

***

"In our first and second experiments, we provide the first controlled evidence that the majority of Goffin’s spontaneously innovated tool set use under controlled experimental conditions, without social facilitation, and learned to apply it flexibly according to need. Furthermore, our third experiment suggests that the tool set is more than just the use of tools in sequence (as historically suggested for chimpanzees before the flexibility of their tool set transport was observed; see introduction): four Goffins were observed to transport two tools simultaneously, and two Goffin’s were able to not only transport their tool set together but even showed some flexibility depending on the task requirements. This suggests that, like in chimpanzees,15 two tools may be categorized as a tool set.

***

"Over the 15 sessions of experiment 1, the birds showed learning, gradually improving on the choice of the correct tool order to solve the tool set box (Figure 3). In the process, we observed a lot of switching behavior between the two tools (Figures 4 and S1). It is likely that picking the short tool initially required some level of impulse control as only the long tool had a direct reward association.

***

"Based on the results presented here, we suggest that tool set use by Goffin’s cockatoos results from individual innovation but seems to be within the capacity of the species (notably, in a more limited capacity, also in wild settings).6 The identification of a tool set in anticipation of future need additionally requires the cognitive capacity to make task-dependent decisions about when to transport more than one tool.

Comment: Knowing what Caledonian crows can do, this is not surprising. Think about ants and bees. Tiny brains can understand a great deal. The bold is a good view of how it works.

QUOTES: "Tulving distinguished between noetic and autonoetic consciousness. Noetic consciousness, he proposed, is the awareness of facts—this is food, that is dangerous, a potential mate is present. Autonoetic consciousness, on the other hand, he said, is the awareness that YOU are the one having the experience. The latter kind of awareness requires a sense of self in time. This is not simply the ability to make a decision that has an impact on future behavior. It instead involves the ability to engage in mental time travel—to envision yourself with a personal past and a hypothetical future (or futures). Tulving suggested that while other animals can engage in future oriented behaviors, and may have noetic experiences, only humans have autonoetic consciousness. (David’s bold)
***
"The difficulty in scientifically measuring consciousness in animals means that we may never truly know for certain what goes on in their minds. But maybe this is not the most important question scientifically. Perhaps we should be more focused on cognitive and behavioral capacities that are clearly shared with, and measurable in, other animals. Some of these shared capacities have clearly contributed to the evolution of our kind of consciousness, and may make possible some form of awareness in other animals, even if the capacities they possess do not make them conscious in the way we are."

DAVID: Note my bold of a quote. The author and I agree. Humans have consciousness. Both animals and we are conscious. Very long article worth reading, which I think supports Adler's view.

dhw:Thank you so much for editing this very long article. It all leads to the blindingly obvious conclusion that if animals are conscious, they are not as conscious as we are. Nobody I know of has ever claimed that they are. And it is equally blindingly obvious that we cannot get inside the minds of other organisms. We CAN only judge what goes on by observing their behaviour, and if their behaviour shows all the signs of awareness, e.g. communicating, decision-making, problem-solving (seems to have been omitted here), expressive responses, cooperation, adaptation to new conditions, complex architecture, complex social structures etc. etc., it seems to me to be the absolute height of what Shapiro calls “large organs chauvinism” to question whether they know what they are doing, i.e. are conscious.

You are welcome. It balances de Waal and Goodall

DAVID: Note my bold of a quote. The author and I agree. Humans have consciousness. Both animals and we are conscious. Very long article worth reading, which I think supports Adler's view.

Thank you so much for editing this very long article. It all leads to the blindingly obvious conclusion that if animals are conscious, they are not as conscious as we are. Nobody I know of has ever claimed that they are. And it is equally blindingly obvious that we cannot get inside the minds of other organisms. We CAN only judge what goes on by observing their behaviour, and if their behaviour shows all the signs of awareness, e.g. communicating, decision-making, problem-solving (seems to have been omitted here), expressive responses, cooperation, adaptation to new conditions, complex architecture, complex social structures etc. etc., it seems to me to be the absolute height of what Shapiro calls “large organs chauvinism” to question whether they know what they are doing, i.e. are conscious.

http://nautil.us/issue/75/story/the-tricky-problem-with-other-minds?mc_cid=683ff8ce07&a...

"...research on animal behavior often involves stimuli that induce significant experiences in people—stimuli that make us feel fear, pain, or pleasure. Some scientists, including esteemed ones, suggest, like Darwin, that because such stimuli make us feel a certain way, if an animal responds similarly, it must feel what we do. For example, the primatologist Frans de Waal expressed this sentiment when he wrote, “If closely related species act the same, the underlying mental processes are probably the same.” And Jane Goodall states, as a matter of fact, that “animals feel pleasure and sadness, excitement and resentment, depression, fear and pain.”13 She “knows” what animals experience because she has seen signifiers of these emotions in their behavior. But if all we had to do to link conscious states like feelings to behavior was to observe behavior, we wouldn’t need arduous scientific research. Mere observation is not sufficient.

***

"The human mind, for example, is now commonly thought of as encompassing conscious and non-conscious aspects. And much of what we humans do as we make our way through daily life is believed to be controlled by the so-called “cognitive unconscious.” While some cognitively processed information makes its way into the conscious mind, most does not.

***

"The fact that some of our cognitive mechanisms are shared with other animals, means that the choice is not between whether complex animal behavior is due to conditioning or consciousness. Non-conscious cognition is an intermediate source of behavioral control, and consciousness should not be assumed to underlie behavior, even complex behavior, unless non-conscious processes can be ruled out.

"Many find it hard to imagine that these kinds of behaviors can be carried out non-consciously in animals since we humans are usually conscious when we do such things ourselves. But the scientific question in an experiment on humans or animals is not whether the organism has the capacity for consciousness in some general sense, but whether consciousness specifically accounts for the behavior that was studied. If this is not tested, the statement that consciousness was involved is not warranted scientifically.

***

"The fact that animals can only respond nonverbally means there is no contrasting class of response that can be used to distinguish conscious from non-conscious processes. Elegant studies show that findings based on non-verbal responses in research on episodic memory, mental time travel, theory of mind, and subjective self-awareness in animals typically do not qualify as compelling evidence for conscious control of behavior. Such results are better accounted in “leaner” terms; that is, by non-conscious control processes. This does not mean that the animals lacked conscious awareness. It simply means that the results of the studies in question do not support the involvement of consciousness in the control of the behavior tested.

***

"The fact that animals can only respond nonverbally means there is no contrasting class of response that can be used to distinguish conscious from non-conscious processes. Elegant studies show that findings based on non-verbal responses in research on episodic memory, mental time travel, theory of mind, and subjective self-awareness in animals typically do not qualify as compelling evidence for conscious control of behavior. Such results are better accounted in “leaner” terms; that is, by non-conscious control processes. This does not mean that the animals lacked conscious awareness. It simply means that the results of the studies in question do not support the involvement of consciousness in the control of the behavior tested.

***

"Tulving distinguished between noetic and autonoetic consciousness. Noetic consciousness, he proposed, is the awareness of facts—this is food, that is dangerous, a potential mate is present. Autonoetic consciousness, on the other hand, he said, is the awareness that YOU are the one having the experience. The latter kind of awareness requires a sense of self in time. This is not simply the ability to make a decision that has an impact on future behavior. It instead involves the ability to engage in mental time travel—to envision yourself with a personal past and a hypothetical future (or futures). Tulving suggested that while other animals can engage in future oriented behaviors, and may have noetic experiences, only humans have autonoetic consciousness. (my bold)

***

"The difficulty in scientifically measuring consciousness in animals means that we may never truly know for certain what goes on in their minds. But maybe this is not the most important question scientifically. Perhaps we should be more focused on cognitive and behavioral capacities that are clearly shared with, and measurable in, other animals. Some of these shared capacities have clearly contributed to the evolution of our kind of consciousness, and may make possible some form of awareness in other animals, even if the capacities they possess do not make them conscious in the way we are."

Comment: Note my bold of a quote. The author and I agree. Humans have consciousness. Both animals and we are conscious. Very long article worth reading, which I think supports Adler's view.

dhw:I’m a great fan of de Waal’s, but this is a subject that depends totally on definition. If by language you mean a sophisticated system of words and syntax, you can almost say we are the only linguistic species. If by language you mean a method of communication (as in expressions like animal language, bird language, dolphin language, ape language), all species are “linguistic”. I said “almost” above, because the example of the vervet monkeys shows a clear similarity to human language: they make sounds which distinguish between different animals – so you might just as well call those sounds words. Infinitely less sophisticated, but following the same principle as human language: sounds used to convey meaning.

DAVID: By expanding the word linguistic to include all meaningful sounds you are correct. My dog is no different than the monkeys. He barks (warning), he growls (beware, back off), he howls (I'm lonely), etc.

Thank you for reproducing these interesting observations.

DAVID: Now Monkey howls for eagles is used to warn of drones:
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2204402-monkeys-use-their-eagle-call-to-warn-each-...

QUOTE: "The vocalisations were distinct from the ones they made in response to models of leopards and snakes, but almost identical to calls made by a related species of monkey in response to eagles. The results suggest a hard-wired response to the perception of an aerial threat and the use of that specific call." (David’s bold)

DAVID: An automatic response, as noted in the bold above.

dhw: Surprise, surprise, the monkeys recognize danger when they see it, and actually use a different sound to indicate that this is a new source of danger. This is exactly how all forms of language work. And I’m sorry, but if these monkeys make a new sound, they are clearly not hard-wired to use that sound, regardless of whether the sound is “almost” the same as their neighbours’ vocabulary for “eagle”. And I would suggest that we are all “hard-wired” to respond to danger – it’s a rather important factor in the struggle for survival.

No one taught my dog his responses. they are typical inherited canine actions, necessary for survival as you note.

DAVID: By expanding the word linguistic to include all meaningful sounds you are correct. My dog is no different than the monkeys. He barks (warning), he growls (beware, back off), he howls (I'm lonely), etc.

Thank you for reproducing these interesting observations.

DAVID: Now Monkey howls for eagles is used to warn of drones:
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2204402-monkeys-use-their-eagle-call-to-warn-each-...

QUOTE: "The vocalisations were distinct from the ones they made in response to models of leopards and snakes, but almost identical to calls made by a related species of monkey in response to eagles. The results suggest a hard-wired response to the perception of an aerial threat and the use of that specific call." (David’s bold)

DAVID: An automatic response, as noted in the bold above.

Surprise, surprise, the monkeys recognize danger when they see it, and actually use a different sound to indicate that this is a new source of danger. This is exactly how all forms of language work. And I’m sorry, but if these monkeys make a new sound, they are clearly not hard-wired to use that sound, regardless of whether the sound is “almost” the same as their neighbours’ vocabulary for “eagle”. And I would suggest that we are all “hard-wired” to respond to danger – it’s a rather important factor in the struggle for survival.

dhw:I’m a great fan of de Waal’s, but this is a subject that depends totally on definition. If by language you mean a sophisticated system of words and syntax, you can almost say we are the only linguistic species. If by language you mean a method of communication (as in expressions like animal language, bird language, dolphin language, ape language), all species are “linguistic”. I said “almost” above, because the example of the vervet monkeys shows a clear similarity to human language: they make sounds which distinguish between different animals – so you might just as well call those sounds words. Infinitely less sophisticated, but following the same principle as human language: sounds used to convey meaning.

By expanding the word linguistic to include all meaningful sounds you are correct. My dog is no different than the monkeys. He barks (warning), he growls (beware, back off), he howls (I'm lonely), etc.

Now Monkey howls for eagles is used to warn of drones:

https://www.newscientist.com/article/2204402-monkeys-use-their-eagle-call-to-warn-each-...

"How do you teach a monkey new tricks? Lab trials have proved difficult places to train monkeys to distinguish between sounds and take different actions in response.

"But in the forests of Senegal’s Niokolo-Koba National Park, researchers were astonished at the speed one species of monkey adapted its behaviour to a new sound.

"Julia Fisher and her team flew drones over one community of green monkeys (Chlorocebus sabaeus) in the area, to see what they made of a new flying object in their environment. They responded instantly, making alarm calls to warn one another of the prospect of a new threat.

" The vocalisations were distinct from the ones they made in response to models of leopards and snakes, but almost identical to calls made by a related species of monkey in response to eagles. The results suggest a hard-wired response to the perception of an aerial threat and the use of that specific call. (my bold)

"The monkeys adapted so quickly to the new noise that they began scanning the skies and making the calls even when played a sound of the drone from the ground.

"The monkeys were never seen issuing alarm calls to birds of prey in the area, suggesting the birds they usually see are not considered a threat. The drones, however, seemed to be perceived as dangerous.

“'It’s certainly disconcerting, unpredictable, something they’ve not seen before, so it makes sense to alert everybody,” says Fisher.

"She says she was “blown away” by how rapidly the monkeys appeared to learn. “The listeners are smart. It’s almost impossible to get a monkey in a lab to do an audio task.” It is not clear why such learning is harder in a lab environment, she says."

Comment: An automatic response, as noted in the bold above. The problem in the lab is easily explained: in the wild is dangerous, the lab isn't. With wild mustang horses, as soon as they realize how they are cared for with easily obtained food and water, they become very docile and cooperative.

http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/d-brief/2019/02/07/honeybees-can-count-add-and-subtra...

"In a paper out today in Science Advances, a team led by Adrian Dyer at RMIT University in Melbourne put the honey-makers’ arithmetic skills to the test. Instead of written numbers and symbols, they used colors to communicate with the bees. Blue for addition, yellow for subtraction, and a series of shapes to denote the numbers.

"They put each honeybee in a Y-shaped maze, where they’d be shown one to five shapes that were either blue or yellow. If the shapes were blue, they needed to fly toward the picture containing one additional shape. If the shapes were yellow, they needed to pick the choice with one fewer shape.

"But the bees could still be simply picking the correct answer based on whether it had more or less of the shapes. So, the researchers sometimes made the incorrect choice more, and sometimes less than the correct choice. This ensured the bees had to properly add and subtract to get the answer right.

"They trained the bees using a reward-punishment system: sweet sugar solution was a reward for right answers, and a solution of bitter-tasting quinine was punishment for wrong answers. They also mixed up the shapes themselves, their sizes, and which side of the maze held the correct answers, to be sure the bees weren’t picking up on some other clues besides quantity.

"After 100 trials using 14 different bees, the bees’ success rate was around 60 to 75 percent. Perhaps not A+ students; but it’s a passing grade. More importantly, it’s statistically significantly higher than it would be if the bees were just flying around randomly — that would be a 50 percent success rate.

"Besides being pretty neat, this opens up the idea that members of the animal kingdom have different cognitive capabilities than we once thought.

"A number of animals, including honeybees, have been shown to understand concepts like less versus more or right versus left. But being able to learn a symbolic representation of a math equation, and then solve future “equations,” is another level. Only a couple of species have been shown to do any sort of addition and subtraction besides humans: mostly apes, monkeys, birds, and spiders. If honeybees can add, what else can they do?

“'(There’s been) a contentious debate about whether to do math-like thinking, you need a human brain and a very advanced culture to enable that,” says Dyer. “We saw that (the honeybees) can do this task which really does inform us that to do basic arithmetic-type operations you don’t need a large brain.”

***

"Felicity Muth, who also studies bee cognition but was not involved in this work, says “I definitely think it’s novel and exciting research.”

“'I think that it makes sense that a lot of animals should be able to tell the difference between small amounts and larger amounts, it makes sense to be able to tell different quantities of food,” says Muth."

Comment: It is very simple math, and the result is not surprising. The bees were carefully trained and only two-thirds achieved the results. Do they really do this in nature? But some abilities can be developed. Certainly they are not flying humans.

https://phys.org/news/2018-11-re-inventing-orangutans-spontaneously-straight-wires.html

"The bending of a hook into wire to fish for the handle of a basket is surprisingly challenging for young children under eight years of age. Now, cognitive biologists and comparative psychologists led by Isabelle Laumer and Alice Auersperg observed hook tool-making for the first time in a non-human primate species—the orangutan. To the researchers' surprise, the apes spontaneously manufactured hook tools out of straight wire within the very first trial and in a second task unbent curved wire to make a straight tool.

"Human children are already proficient tool users and tool makers from an early age. Nevertheless, when confronted with a task requiring them to innovate a hooked tool out of a straight piece of wire in order to retrieve a basket from the bottom of a vertical tube, the job proved challenging for children: Three- to five-year-old children rarely succeed, and even at the age of seven, fewer than half were able to solve the task. Only at the age of eight, the majority of children were able to innovate a hook tool. Interestingly, children of all tested age classes succeeded when given demonstrations on how to bend a hook and use it. Thus, although young children apparently understand what kind of tool is required and are skilled enough to make a functional tool, there seems to be a cognitive obstacle in innovating one.

"The team, consisting of cognitive biologists and comparative psychologists from the University of Vienna, the University of St. Andrews and the University of Veterinary Medicine in Vienna, report for the first time a primate species in the hook-bending task. "We confronted the orangutans with a vertical tube containing a reward basket with a handle and a straight piece of wire. In a second task with a horizontal tube containing a reward at its centre and a piece of wire that was bent at 90 degrees," explains Isabelle Laumer, who conducted the study at the Zoo Leipzig in Germany. "Retrieving the reward from the vertical tube thus required the orangutans to bend a hook into the wire to fish the basket out of the tube. The horizontal tube in turn required the apes to unbend the bent piece of wire in order to make it long enough to push the food out of the tube."

"Several orangutans mastered the hook bending task and the unbending task. Two orangutans even solved both tasks within the first minutes of the very first trial. "The orangutans mostly bent the hooks directly with their teeth and mouths, while keeping the rest of the tool straight. Thereafter, they immediately inserted it in the correct orientation, hooked the handle and pulled the basket up," she says.

***

"The hook-bending task has become a benchmark paradigm to test tool innovation abilities in comparative psychology," says Alice Auersperg from the University of Veterinary Medicine in Vienna. "Considering the speed of their hook innovation, it seems that they actively invented a solution to this problem rather than applying routinized behaviours."

"Josep Call of the University of St. Andrews says, "Finding this capacity in one of our closest relatives is astonishing. In human evolution, hook tools appear relatively late. Fish hooks and harpoon-like, curved objects date back only approximately 16,000 to 60,000 years. Although New Caledonian crows use hooks with regularity, there are a few observations of wild apes, such as chimpanzees and orangutans, that use previously detached branches to catch and retrieve out-of-reach branches for locomotion in the canopy. Such branch-hauling tools might represent one of the earliest and simplest raking tools used and made by great apes and our ancestors," says Josep Call of the University of St. Andrews."

Comment: Fascinating.

FRANZ DE WAAL: You won’t often hear me say something like this, but I consider humans the only linguistic species. We honestly have no evidence for symbolic communication, equally rich and multifunctional as ours, outside our species. (David’s bold)

QUOTE: "Honeybees accurately signal distant nectar locations to the hive, and monkeys might utter calls in predictable sequences that resemble rudimentary syntax. The most intriguing parallel is perhaps referential signalling. Vervet monkeys on the plains of Kenya have distinct alarm calls for a leopard, an eagle or a snake. These predator-specific calls constitute a life-saving communication system, because different dangers demand different responses. For example, the right response to a snake alarm is to stand upright in the tall grass and look around, which would be suicidal if a leopard lurks in the grass. Instead of having special calls, some other monkey species combine the same calls in different ways under different circumstances. You wouldn’t call it language, but it unquestionably carries rich meaning."

dhw:I’m a great fan of de Waal’s, but this is a subject that depends totally on definition. If by language you mean a sophisticated system of words and syntax, you can almost say we are the only linguistic species. If by language you mean a method of communication (as in expressions like animal language, bird language, dolphin language, ape language), all species are “linguistic”. I said “almost” above, because the example of the vervet monkeys shows a clear similarity to human language: they make sounds which distinguish between different animals – so you might just as well call those sounds words. Infinitely less sophisticated, but following the same principle as human language: sounds used to convey meaning.

By expanding the word linguistic to include all meaningful sounds you are correct. My dog is no different than the monkeys. He barks (warning), he growls (beware, back off), he howls (I'm lonely), etc.

QUOTE: "Honeybees accurately signal distant nectar locations to the hive, and monkeys might utter calls in predictable sequences that resemble rudimentary syntax. The most intriguing parallel is perhaps referential signalling. Vervet monkeys on the plains of Kenya have distinct alarm calls for a leopard, an eagle or a snake. These predator-specific calls constitute a life-saving communication system, because different dangers demand different responses. For example, the right response to a snake alarm is to stand upright in the tall grass and look around, which would be suicidal if a leopard lurks in the grass. Instead of having special calls, some other monkey species combine the same calls in different ways under different circumstances. You wouldn’t call it language, but it unquestionably carries rich meaning."

I’m a great fan of de Waal’s, but this is a subject that depends totally on definition. If by language you mean a sophisticated system of words and syntax, you can almost say we are the only linguistic species. If by language you mean a method of communication (as in expressions like animal language, bird language, dolphin language, ape language), all species are “linguistic”. I said “almost” above, because the example of the vervet monkeys shows a clear similarity to human language: they make sounds which distinguish between different animals – so you might just as well call those sounds words. Infinitely less sophisticated, but following the same principle as human language: sounds used to convey meaning.

https://aeon.co/ideas/the-link-between-language-and-cognition-is-a-red-herring?utm_sour...

" You won’t often hear me say something like this, but I consider humans the only linguistic species. We honestly have no evidence for symbolic communication, equally rich and multifunctional as ours, outside our species. Language parallels between our species and others have been called a ‘red herring’. But as with so many larger human phenomena, once we break it down into smaller pieces, some of these pieces can be found elsewhere. It is a procedure I have applied myself in my popular books about primate politics, culture, even morality. Critical pieces such as power alliances (politics) and the spreading of habits (culture), as well as empathy and fairness (morality), are detectable outside our species. The same holds for capacities underlying language. (my bold)

"Honeybees accurately signal distant nectar locations to the hive, and monkeys might utter calls in predictable sequences that resemble rudimentary syntax. The most intriguing parallel is perhaps referential signalling. Vervet monkeys on the plains of Kenya have distinct alarm calls for a leopard, an eagle or a snake. These predator-specific calls constitute a life-saving communication system, because different dangers demand different responses. For example, the right response to a snake alarm is to stand upright in the tall grass and look around, which would be suicidal if a leopard lurks in the grass. Instead of having special calls, some other monkey species combine the same calls in different ways under different circumstances. You wouldn’t call it language, but it unquestionably carries rich meaning.

"Hand gestures among other primates are especially noteworthy, since in the apes they are under voluntary control and often learned. Apes move and wave their hands all the time while communicating, and they have an impressive repertoire of specific gestures such as stretching out an open hand to beg for something, or moving a whole arm over another as a sign of dominance. We share this behaviour with them and only them: monkeys have virtually no such gestures. The manual signals of apes are intentional, highly flexible and used to refine the message of communication.

"When a chimp holds out his hand to a friend who is eating, he is asking for a share, but when the same chimp is under attack and holds out his hand to a bystander, he is asking for protection. He might even point out his opponent by making angry slapping gestures in his direction. But although gestures are more context-dependent than other signals and greatly enrich communication, comparisons with human language remain a stretch.

"There is a notable irony here. In an earlier age, the absence of language was used as an argument against the existence of thought in other species. Today I find myself upholding the position that the manifest reality of thinking by nonlinguistic creatures argues against the importance of language."

Comment: Cognition does not require language obviously. I go to the kitchen without verbalizing it in my head. But humans think complex ideas, concepts, theories in language in their heads. He points this out in the first paragraph I presented.

dhw: Thank you for presenting and editing this article. I am full of admiration and gratitude for the manner in which you continue to monitor all these developments for us.

I have now read the whole article, which I find stimulating and thought-provoking, but unless we actually have a definition of consciousness, I also find it a bit frustrating....If we define consciousness simply as awareness, I think the picture becomes much clearer. Any organism that is aware of its environment (including other organisms), can process information, take decisions based on that information, communicate with other organisms, learn from experience etc. - all of which require awareness – in my book, qualifies to be called conscious.

Thank you. I'll keep on. You are certainly correct. I feel anything with a brain is aware and conscious.

dhw: The question then is not WHETHER an organism is conscious/aware, but what it is conscious/aware of, and the answer to that question (which will depend on our subjective observations of behaviour) will determine the degree of consciousness. I am becoming increasingly convinced that even the smallest organisms fulfil the above criteria.

Of course we still disagree about organisms without a brain.

I agree that they are at a different level. (See below)

https://aeon.co/essays/why-wont-biologists-say-that-animals-might-be-conscious?utm_sour...

QUOTES: Anthropomorphism becomes a problem here because it inevitably calls upon the idea that animals are conscious, which is a hypothesis that cannot be tested.

Cognitive abilities such as abstract representation are not the same as consciousness. They just seem to cohabit in the one species – humans – to which we are comfortable ascribing consciousness.

It is only a muddling of the distinction between consciousness and cognition, and researchers’ convention against assuming consciousness, that forces us to play down the intellectual prowess of our companion species. We would do well to break this habit.

To be clear, I have no crusade to blow open the doors of animal behaviour research and declare every animal a conscious mind. But nor should we be hubristic about the differences between humans and other vertebrates. That’s another sin in the biological sciences.

David’s comment: We cannot get inside, but we can recognize animal's cognitive abilities, tool use, intentionality of purposive activity, etc. But we can be sure they do not analyze or evaluate what they do, as we do. Humans are different, not by degree, but by kind.

Thank you for presenting and editing this article. I am full of admiration and gratitude for the manner in which you continue to monitor all these developments for us.

I have now read the whole article, which I find stimulating and thought-provoking, but unless we actually have a definition of consciousness, I also find it a bit frustrating. I do not accept the distinction between cognition and consciousness, because for me cognition is one inseparable element of consciousness. If we define consciousness simply as awareness, I think the picture becomes much clearer. Any organism that is aware of its environment (including other organisms), can process information, take decisions based on that information, communicate with other organisms, learn from experience etc. - all of which require awareness – in my book, qualifies to be called conscious. The question then is not WHETHER an organism is conscious/aware, but what it is conscious/aware of, and the answer to that question (which will depend on our subjective observations of behaviour) will determine the degree of consciousness. I am becoming increasingly convinced that even the smallest organisms fulfil the above criteria. That does not mean they are mini-humans, any more than it means humans are maxi-ants. My suggestion would be that there are many similarities handed down from our common ancestors (the reverse direction from anthropomorphism), and many differences, because species – broad sense – are all different in kind and consequently “think” differently. But I agree with you, of course, that humans are aware of a vastly greater range of things than other organisms, which means we have a far, far higher “level” (your word) of consciousness, and this has resulted in our extraordinary powers of analysis, observation and creativity. I also agree with the author that we should not underestimate the intellectual prowess of our fellow animals, and we should not be hubristic about anything!

https://aeon.co/essays/why-wont-biologists-say-that-animals-might-be-conscious?utm_sour...

my colleagues and I trained ducklings to recognise, for example, two red spheres, via imprinting. This is the process by which young birds can learn to identify and follow a moving object, normally their mother. The shapes were attached to rotating booms, and the ducklings followed them around like a mother duck. Then we gave them a choice between two more pairs of shapes: two red pyramids, and a red cube and a red rectangular prism.

To everyone’s surprise, the ducklings could spot the difference. Both sets of shapes were new to them, but the identical pair had a familiar ‘sameness’, and so the ducklings were drawn to it. They showed an equivalent preference for matching colours – when they were primed on two green spheres, for example, they picked a blue pair over a mixed violet and orange pair – and for difference itself, preferring mismatched shapes or colours when they had imprinted on a non-identical pair.

***

It helps researchers maintain an intellectual distance and avoid anthropomorphism, which is a cardinal sin in the study of animal behaviour.

***

The reluctance of my field to engage seriously with animal consciousness is, I believe, holding back our efforts to truly understand their behaviour.

***

Anthropomorphism becomes a problem here because it inevitably calls upon the idea that animals are conscious, which is a hypothesis that cannot be tested.

For example, when my ducklings show that they can tell apart pairs of objects that are identical from pairs that are mismatched, we can say that the ducklings can discriminate abstract relationships, or learn abstract relationships, or compute or recognise or parse abstract relationships. ....What we cannot say is that the duckling thinks that the relationships are different, in the way a human might.

***

Whatever evolutionary history has led a duckling to do something will have tailored that behaviour to success, whether the action is consciously thought about or not. So to the external observer of behaviour, or even of neurons firing, there will be no difference.  (my bold)

***

My lab ducklings mustn’t think – getting at the heart of what they do requires that I approach them from this perspective. I want to understand how their behaviours have evolved, and the adaptive purposes they serve. If they are thinking, regardless of the definition, it is merely part of the process that governs their behaviour, a process that will be evolutionarily constructed to produce the outcome that is beneficial to the duckling.

***

In the case of my concept-learning ducks, they might have made the discrimination by recognising visual features, rather than forming concepts.

***

Cognitive abilities such as abstract representation are not the same as consciousness. They just seem to cohabit in the one species – humans – to which we are comfortable ascribing consciousness. Cognition is a much easier nut to crack than consciousness, and seems to be reliably related to various physical properties (brain-to-body ratio, and neuron number and density, for example, among many others). There is no reason to shy away from ascribing cognitive abilities for fear of accidentally summoning the spectre of consciousness.

***

It is only a muddling of the distinction between consciousness and cognition, and researchers’ convention against assuming consciousness, that forces us to play down the intellectual prowess of our companion species. We would do well to break this habit.

To be clear, I have no crusade to blow open the doors of animal behaviour research and declare every animal a conscious mind. But nor should we be hubristic about the differences between humans and other vertebrates. That’s another sin in the biological sciences.

Comment: We cannot get inside, but we can recognize animal's cognitive abilities, tool use, intentionality of purposive activity, etc. But we can be sure they do not analyze or evaluate what they do, as we do. Humans are different, not by degree, but by kind. Giant essay. Worth reading it all.

DAVID's comment: As we've agreed, balance goes on and everyone gets the energy they need to survive and possibly evolve.

dhw: Everyone does not get the energy they need to survive. 99% of species have gone extinct. But it’s interesting to hear that you think that “everyone” might possibly go on evolving. Previously, I thought you thought humans marked the end point.

I'm taking about evolution in an historical sense. I think we at the end point.

DAVID: And I have no idea how the weaverbird nest was invented, but since I accept God, I have an answer.
dhw: Not “how”. You have told us that God must have designed it, because it’s too complex for the stupid old weaverbird. The question is why, since you believe all such complexities were necessary to balance life so that humans could appear. No nest, no humans? It is perfectly possible to “accept God” and also accept that the weaverbird may have done its own designing.
DAVID: Because balance requires a multiplicity of factors including apex predators:
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/laelaps/when-lions-abound-hyenas-pick-a-new-menu/?...
DAVID's comment: As we've agreed, balance goes on and everyone gets the energy they need to survive and possibly evolve.

Everyone does not get the energy they need to survive. 99% of species have gone extinct. But it’s interesting to hear that you think that “everyone” might possibly go on evolving. Previously, I thought you thought humans marked the end point.

Under “Hungry cockatoos use tools”:
QUOTE: Rutz says careful study of birds in the wild might show that Goffin’s cockatoos are natural toolmakers too – although Figaro and his friends may have worked out how to make tools spontaneously. “Both of the options remain a possibility,” he says."
David’s comment: Corvids do it in the wild, so this is something these bird brains can handle. Very impressive.

It certainly is. Scientists are discovering more and more talents in our fellow animals. One day, they may even discover that weaverbirds are intelligent enough to design their own nests.

DHW: I am suggesting that just as other organisms are known to respond to needs by changing their own anatomy, our ancestors did the same.
DAVID: We do not know that organisms do any more than minor adaptions on their own. You have overstated evolution theory.

Once again: It is a HYPOTHESIS to try and explain speciation. Just as divine preprogramming and/or dabbling is a HYPOTHESIS. Nobody knows how speciation took place. That is why we theorize.

DAVID: I should have said pre-ordained, just as your statement does.

dhw: Does this mean your God organized every advance in our culture(s)? Every religion, every art, every language, every bomb – all preordained? Where does pre-ordaining end and free will begin?

You are playing word games. My 'preordained' simply means that with our giant brain the advances had to occur through humans developng use of that brain.

dhw: I assume you believe that humans are an “improvement” over bacteria. The only reason you have given for the millions of other unrelated complexities is “balance of life”, which you agree simply means life continues. The futility of that argument is exemplified by our next exchange.

Twisting meaning again. Balance supplies energy for life to continue evolving, nothing more.

[/i]
DAVID: And I have no idea how the weaverbird nest was invented, but since I accept God, I have an answer.

dhw: Not “how”. You have told us that God must have designed it, because it’s too complex for the stupid old weaverbird. The question is why, since you believe all such complexities were necessary to balance life so that humans could appear. No nest, no humans? It is perfectly possible to “accept God” and also accept that the weaverbird may have done its own designing.

Because balance requires a multiplicity of factors including apex predators:

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/laelaps/when-lions-abound-hyenas-pick-a-new-menu/?...

"For as long as there have been lions and spotted hyenas, the carnivores have competed with each other. The gore-flecked conflicts over carcasses on the African grassland are just the latest skirmishes in a carnivoran competition that has been going on since the Pleistocene.

***

"Clans of hyenas are capable of taking down prey as large as juvenile elephants as well as reducing carcasses to piles of splinters with their exceptionally powerful jaws. This combination of skills has allowed them to thrive in lands stalked by their Ice Age competitors. As Stéphanie Périquet and colleagues have found during a long-term study of hyenas in Zimbabwe’s Hwange National Park, when too many lions are around the hyenas simply change what’s on the menu.

***

"The scavenging shift may be attributable to the way hyenas hunt. Hyenas are pretty noisy when taking down prey, Périquet and colleagues note, and this makes it all the easier for lions to find them and snatch their kills away. By traveling in smaller groups and hunting less, the Hwange National Park hyenas were able to go dark and avoid risking fights with enraged lions.

"And the change worked. The hyena population, Périquet and coauthors note, remained stable even as lions moved in. Hyenas didn’t go from apex predators to dangling at the bottom of the food chain. Their magnificent jaws offered them another option, giving them plenty of reason to laugh at those pushy lions."

Comment: As we've agreed, balance goes on and everyone gets the energy they need to survive and possibly evolve.

Xxxx
[ yes indeed, I am suggesting that just as other organisms are known to respond to needs by changing their own anatomy, our ancestors did the same.

We do not know that organisms do any more than minor adaptions on their own. You have overstated evolution theory.

Does this mean your God organized every advance in our culture(s)? Every religion, every art, every language, every bomb – all preordained? Where does pre-ordaining end and free will begin?

DAVID: I've noted previously my drive to complexity includes improvement. I am not espousing complexity for the sake of unreasonable useless complexity.
dhw: Good. If complexity had a purpose, then I suggest that purpose was improvement. What other purposes do you “include”?
DAVID: Creating humans, the most complex anatomically and mentally.

I assume you believe that humans are an “improvement” over bacteria. The only reason you have given for the millions of other unrelated complexities is “balance of life”, which you agree simply means life continues. The futility of that argument is exemplified by our next exchange.

DAVID: Then tell me why humans appeared for no reason, against all odds.
dhw: I have done so: for the same reason as every other multicellular organism appeared against all reason, against all odds - the drive for improvement. But as an agnostic, I do not discount a divine dabble. I simply do not believe that your God designed the weaverbird’s nest in order to keep life going for the sake of humans.

DAVID: And I have no idea how the weaverbird nest was invented, but since I accept God, I have an answer.

Not “how”. You have told us that God must have designed it, because it’s too complex for the stupid old weaverbird. The question is why, since you believe all such complexities were necessary to balance life so that humans could appear. No nest, no humans? It is perfectly possible to “accept God” and also accept that the weaverbird may have done its own designing.

Xxxx
David’s comment under "Ape gestures": Yes, why language?

dhw: The answer is contained in the text you have quoted: “At some point, it became necessary for our human ancestors to communicate about more than these immediate goals, and therein lies the mystery of language evolution.” The mystery is the enhanced consciousness, which has led to every other advancement, including language.
DAVID: You can't be implying that the stress of needing language created the anatomy for speech and the giant brain? Other primates weren't that stressed.

We have been over this before in full detail, including all the necessary anatomical changes. Once humans had acquired their enhanced consciousness, they needed “to communicate about more than these immediate goals”. And so, yes indeed, I am suggesting that just as other organisms are known to respond to needs by changing their own anatomy, our ancestors did the same. That is the hypothesis I offer for adaptations and innovations, but it does not explain how humans acquired the enhanced consciousness that led to the need for new sounds. THAT is the inexplicable leap.

DAVID: Of course learning to use our huge ability with our new consciousness took time after it appeared in the first H. sapiens 200,000 years ago. But our current culture and ability was ordained back then. You have talked around that gap in evolution.

dhw: What do you mean by “ordained”? Are you now saying that as well as preprogramming humans, God also preprogrammed our culture? The gap in evolution is the leap to human levels of consciousness, from which our culture (including language) evolved “brick by brick”. Nobody knows what caused the leap, but I have acknowledged the possibility of your God dabbling. That is not talking round the gap – it is an acknowledgement that the gap has not been explained.

I should have said pre-ordained, just as your statement does.

DAVID: I've noted previously my drive to complexity includes improvement. I am not espousing complexity for the sake of unreasonable useless complexity.

dhw: Good. If complexity had a purpose, then I suggest that purpose was improvement. What other purposes do you “include”?

Creating humans, the most complex anatomically and mentally.

DAVID: Then tell me why humans appeared for no reason, against all odds.

dhw: I have done so: for the same reason as every other multicellular organism appeared against all reason, against all odds - the drive for improvement. But as an agnostic, I do not discount a divine dabble. I simply do not believe that your God designed the weaverbird’s nest in order to keep life going for the sake of humans.

And I have no idea how the weaverbird nest was invented, but since I accept God, I have an answer.

Xxxx

David’s comment under "Ape gestures": Yes, why language? The apes have never changed and we grew a great brain and the proper anatomy which could handle language. That reduced the need for trying to understand gestures, which are good only for immediate needs. We are different, not in degree but in kind. We can discuss anything, any concept.

dhw: The answer is contained in the text you have quoted: “At some point, it became necessary for our human ancestors to communicate about more than these immediate goals, and therein lies the mystery of language evolution.” The mystery is the enhanced consciousness, which has led to every other advancement, including language.

You can't be implying that the stress of needing language created the anatomy for speech and the giant brain? Other primates weren't that stressed.