A Sense of Free Will: the consciousness quagmire (Introduction)

by dhw, Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 14:08 (3147 days ago) @ romansh

ROMANSH: “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master - - that's all.” -[..............]-ROMANSH: Now I don't know whether I have defended my ‘hard' deterministic definition sufficiently for you or not. -Thank you for your admirable account of the three schools of thought regarding free will (too long to repeat here), but I'm afraid it does not provide any defence of your definition. Humpty Dumpty deliberately makes discussion impossible. As you are no doubt well aware, he goes on to talk of “impenetrability”, and on being asked what it means, he replies: “I meant by “impenetrability” that we've had enough of that subject.” Your definition (“the ability to act or make choices independently of the environment and the universe”) impenetrably ends all discussion on the subject, since nothing in the universe can be independent of the universe. The definition itself should be neutral, and you will certainly have noticed that the Wikipedia article you quote defines free will as “the ability to choose between different possible courses of action.” All the arguments that follow discuss whether and why we have or do not have that ability.-ROMANSH: Note I simply use determinism in the sense of cause and effect, no more no less.-In my post of 6 September at 15.15, I gave you the clearest possible response to your deterministic argument: “Of course we are all subject to cause and effect, and so our choices are dependent on factors beyond our own control: chemical, hereditary, environmental, educational etc. In this sense, we do not have free will, as we do not make our own conscious choices.” Your own Humpty Dumpty response was: “When you say In this sense, we do not have free will what are the ramifications of this? Do you actually believe what you just said?” Since our subject is the existence or not of free will, I did not wish to go into the psychological, social and moral ramifications of our not having free will, and yes, on this particular level of discussion I believe what I say. However, in your Humpty Dumpty way (I hope this doesn't sound rude, but I just love the reference!) you then totally ignored the second part of that post, in which I outlined another approach to the subject (very different from the one that David has just offered us), which I will repeat but also slightly expand at the end of this post. The point of course is that whether we think we have free will depends, as I wrote then, “on the level at which we wish to consider it.”
 
First, though, in relation to the consciousness that forms part of my own definitions (“the ability to make one's own conscious choices within given constraints” or “an entity's conscious ability to control its decision-making process within given constraints”), you wrote: “I find I am not aware of what I am writing - except in a historical sense.” I asked (7 September) what you meant by “historical sense”, and suggested that perhaps you were confusing the existence of this awareness with knowledge of how your thoughts formulate themselves. In my view, consciousness is integral to the question of whether free will exists or not. If you are a zombie, you will not have the conscious ability to choose, no matter what level we are at.-ROMANSH: So what are the consequences of every atom, fundamental particle or energy responding in either a mechanical or probabilistic way with respect to free will?-On this level, as already stated above, the consequences are that we do not have conscious control of our decisions, and you don't need me to spell out the psychological, social and moral ramifications of such a conclusion. However, as stated on 6 September, when I am conscious of a choice, the way in which I consciously make it is still uniquely mine and nobody else's, and the thoughts that accompany the process are uniquely mine and nobody else's, regardless of the influences that have made me what I am. (This fits in with the compatibilist interpretation of freedom as ‘not coerced', or 'not against my will'.) Therefore on this level, I do have conscious control of my decisions. This level can also encompass libertarianism, because although I cannot break the chain of cause and effect, nevertheless my “wilful” decisions themselves may create a new causal chain (= origination) which could have been different had I not made the conscious choice I did make. And so I can only repeat that for me the answer lies in the level at which you approach the subject of free will - which perhaps boils down to answering the question “free from what?”. In your uniquely Romanshic way, you have (freely or not freely) chosen the first level. In my uniquely dhw way, I (freely or not freely) accept both, as they both make equally good sense to me.